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BANKRUPTCY FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN THE
WORLD OF CLAIMS TRADING
John A. E. Pottow *
ABSTRACT
In earlier work, I explored the role of fiduciary duties in the bankruptcy
trustee’s administration of a debtor’s estate, noting the absence of any
explicit demarcation of those duties in the Bankruptcy Code. In this piece, I
report the highlights of that analysis and see to what extent (if any) fiduciary
duties can inform policy prescriptions for the issue of bankruptcy claims
trading, colorfully referred to by some as the world of “bankruptcy M&A.”
My initial take is pessimistic. Fiduciary duties, at least as traditionally
conceived in bankruptcy, are unlikely to provide much help. But there is still
a source of optimism. Namely, the structural and procedural institutions of
the Bankruptcy Code and court system may, through a transparent, courtsupervised litigation process, achieve many of the same conflict-checking
functions with which fiduciary duty law concerns itself.
INTRODUCTION
Currently, the Bankruptcy Code does not specifically address fiduciary
duties imposed upon trustees in managing bankruptcy estates, although these
duties clearly saddle such professionals in the discharge of their obligations. 1
The growing world of bankruptcy claims trading, also known more colorfully
as bankruptcy M&A, 2 has now added new layers and complexities to this
contentious and underspecified aspect of bankruptcy, for both trustees and
creditors alike. Yet substantive doctrines of fiduciary duty do little to resolve
inherent conflicts of interest, leaving trustees subject to sometimes divergent
obligations—a situation only exacerbated when bankruptcy M&A takes
* John Philip Dawson Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Thanks for
research assistance go to Conor McNamara, Michigan JD Class of 2018. Helpful comments
were provided by Daniel Greenwood, Ted Janger, Adam Levitin, Jay Westbrook, and all coparticipants in our excellent symposium.
1. John A. E. Pottow, Fiduciary Duties in Bankruptcy and Insolvency, THE OXFORD

HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW (forthcoming 2018) (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & Robert H.
Sitkoff, eds.) (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 17-014; Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law
Research Paper No. 566) (manuscript at 8), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=3032615.
2. Marc E. Albert & Katherine M. Sutcliffe Becker, Stinson Morrison Hecker LLP, Key Issues
in Acquisitions and Sales of Distressed Companies, THOMSON REUTERS ASPATORE, 2009 WL
788626, at *6; Brooke Masters & Julie MacIntosh, Bankruptcy-Related M&A has ‘Only Just
Begun’, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2009), https://www.ft.com/content/05234d00-2788-11de-9b7700144feabdc0; see also Edward J. Janger & Adam J. Levitin, One Dollar, One Vote: Mark-toMarket Governance in Bankruptcy 16 (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 567,
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3247267 (“Creditors have the power to
influence the conduct of the case in various ways, and acquire key governance rights with regard to
bankruptcy plan confirmation.”).
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place. All is not lost, however, as hope may be found in the procedural and
institutional safeguards that draw creditor disputes out into an open judicial
forum where they can be fully and fairly adjudicated (although for such
procedural mechanisms to be maximally effective, the spirit of disclosure
emphasized in Rule 2019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
should probably be amplified).
Part I of this Article provides an overview of bankruptcy trustees’
fiduciary duties and the various protections trustees enjoy from breach of
fiduciary duty lawsuits, critically analyzing these duties. Part II applies these
fiduciary duties to the bankruptcy M&A context and considers what
guidance, if any, they provide for directing trustee or creditor behavior and
decision-making. Finally, this Article points to the Commodore standing
doctrine as a beneficial alternative to fiduciary mandates for resolving trustee
and creditor conflicts in this area.
I. TRUSTEE FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN BANKRUPTCY
A. DEFINITION/SCOPE OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Because the fiduciary debtor-in-possession (DIP) in chapter 11 is
derivative of the chapter 7 trustee model, 3 I focus on the chapter 7 trustee’s
fiduciary duties. Indeed, “fiduciary” duties fit comfortably with the very idea
of a “trustee,” which invokes the law of trusts, a canonical source of fiduciary
obligation. 4 My key conclusions on the chapter 7 trustee’s fiduciary duties
can be summarized as follows.
First, not all (or perhaps even most) of the trustee’s duties to the chapter
7 estate can be fairly characterized as “fiduciary.” 5 To be sure, many sound
in explicitly fiduciary registers, such as the obligation under the Bankruptcy
Code “to be accountable for all property received,” 6 which expressly invokes
trust law’s remedy of an accounting. 7 So, too, do even neutrally phrased Code
obligations, such as the duty to “collect and reduce to money the property of
the estate for which such trustee serves,” frequently attract courts to impress

3. 11 U.S.C. § 1106 (2012) (vesting DIP in most, but not all, of chapter 7 trustee’s
responsibilities).
4. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Willoughby v. Howard, 302 U.S. 445, 450 (1938) (“[E]very trustee or
receiver of an estate has the duty of exercising reasonable care in the custody of the fiduciary estate
. . . .”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77 (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“The duty of prudence
requires the exercise of reasonable care . . . .”).
5. Steven W. Rhodes, The Fiduciary and Institutional Obligations of a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
Trustee, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 147, 147–48 (2006) (dividing trustees’ obligations into “fiduciary”
obligations, owed to the “bankruptcy court and the parties in cases in which the trustee serves,” and
“institutional” obligations, owed “to the bankruptcy process itself”).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(2).
7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 83 (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“A trustee has a duty to
. . . provide beneficiaries with reports or accountings.”).
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upon trustees a fiduciary obligation. 8 But there are many other obligations
imposed upon the chapter 7 trustee that are neutral at best and carry no
fiduciary duty. 9 We might call them mere “statutory” obligations. Consider
the charge to “if advisable, oppose the discharge of the debtor.” 10 The trustee
has no creditor-based obligation to do so, and, indeed, this has nothing to do
with the trustee’s role in helping creditors divide the debtor’s estate. Rather,
a discharge objection turns to the debtor’s post-estate, post-trustee life.
Most interesting, however, are duties of the trustee that might be
considered “anti-fiduciary.” This label stems from the proposition that the
presumed beneficiaries of the “trust” for which the trustee serves are the
estate’s creditors (with the debtor as ultimate residual beneficiary). 11 Yet the
trustee is charged with a duty, if “a purpose would be served,” to “examine
[creditors’] proofs of claims and object to the allowance of any claim that is
improper.” 12 This means that trustees are not unadulterated champions of
their creditors. They can (and often do) switch gears into an adversarial
capacity toward their purported wards—the antithesis of the traditional
fiduciary relationship.
Thus, looking at the chapter 7 trustee, we realize that simply calling him
or her a “fiduciary” of the estate is too simple—notwithstanding the
inexorable appeal to bankruptcy courts of doing so. 13 Bankruptcy often has
conflicting alignments of interested parties, and even the trustee is not
immune from shifting allegiances. 14 Recognizing these shifting allegiances
is the first stage of understanding the unique challenges for the ascription of
fiduciary duty in the bankruptcy context, even for the simplest, most
canonical form of fiduciary: the bankruptcy trustee.

8. 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1); see, e.g., Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530
U.S. 1, 12 (2000) (“[T]rustee is obliged to seek recovery . . . whenever his fiduciary duties so
require.”). Trust law envisions a duty to take custody of assets when necessary, but not to liquidate
them. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76 (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (imposing responsibility
to “collect[] and protect[] trust property”).
9. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(a)(10), (12) (requiring notice to certain domestic support
creditors or transfer of patients to health care facilities).
10. Id. § 704(a)(6).
11. See, e.g., id. § 702(b) (allowing creditors of estate to vote for trustee); In re Cent. Ice Cream
Co., 836 F.2d 1068, 1072–73 (7th Cir. 1987) (reminding that equity, not creditors, holds ultimate
residual interest of corporate debtor).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5).
13. See, e.g., In re Engman, 331 B.R. 277, 288 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2005) (describing trustee
simply as “fiduciary of the bankruptcy estate”).
14. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“A trustee has a duty
to administer the trust in a manner that is impartial with respect to the various beneficiaries of the
trust . . . .”); see also Rhodes, supra note 5, at 149, 208 (contending that trustees have “obligations
. . . to protect the integrity of the bankruptcy process,” but that “it is hard to justify imposing the
costs of the objection on the creditors”).
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B. TRUSTEE DUTIES
1. Duty of Care
When the trustee is a fiduciary under the Bankruptcy Code, the
traditional duties of care and loyalty kick in. 15 But the duty of care is perhaps
more effectively policed “extra-legally,” rather than through the traditional
trust law remedy of litigation for breach. This is because panel trustees are
certified and removed by the U.S. Trustee’s Office and subject to various
restrictions. 16 As such, repeat play fiduciaries are to a certain extent regulated
by public actors, minimizing (although not eliminating) the need for private
enforcement through suit. Lest you worry, however, that reliance on public
actors alone suffices, rest assured that the trustee’s clarity is focused by the
obligation to post a performance bond, which can be duly forfeited upon
proper showing. 17 Instances of such forfeiture are understandably rare, but
not unheard of. 18
Finally, the trustee’s care obligations derived from the Code are a floor,
not a ceiling. Many courts advert to general, common law fiduciary duties
that supplement a trustee’s statutorily delineated obligations,19 drawing upon
such general sources as the Restatement of Trusts. 20 But again, while these
cases may make waves, I suspect most of the work is being done offstage
through the (de-)(re-)credentialing procedures of the U.S. Trustee. 21

15. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (requiring trustee to be a “disinterested” party); U.S. ex rel.
Willoughby v. Howard, 302 U.S. 445, 450 (1938) (“[E]very trustee or receiver of an estate has the
duty of exercising reasonable care in the custody of the fiduciary estate . . . .”); cf. 11 U.S.C.
§ 321(a)(1) (requiring trustee to be “competent”).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(1), (3) (2012) (enabling U.S. Trustee oversight of panel trustees); see
also, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 321(a)(1) (“competen[ce]”); In re Lowery, 215 B.R. 140, 141–42 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1997) (finding trustee “obviously” competent “by virtue of being a member of the United
States Trustee’s panel of trustees”).
17. See 11 U.S.C. § 322(a); R. Woolsey & Assocs., Inc. v. Gugino (In re R. Woolsey & Assocs.,
Inc.), 454 B.R. 782, 785–86 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2011) (“The purpose of the bond is to [en]sure faithful
performance by the trustee and to indemnify the estate for any loss that might be sustained as a
result of the misfeasance or malfeasance of the trustee.”) (quoting 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶
322.02 [2] at 322–24 (Richard Levin and Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2018)).
18. See, e.g., In re Schooler, 449 B.R. 502, 517 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010) (finding liability of
surety under blanket bond triggered by trustee’s gross negligence).
19. See, e.g., In re Markos Gurnee P’ship, 182 B.R. 211, 219 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (citing
Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 271 (1951)) (“Beyond the statutory duties, bankruptcy trustees
owe to the beneficiaries of the estate the usual common law trust duties . . . .”).
20. See, e.g., In re Ferrante, 51 F.3d 1473, 1479–80 (9th Cir. 1995) (“When a trustee receives
funds as trustee, he holds them as a fiduciary and is accountable for them.”) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1959)).
21. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 58.6 (2017); Review of the Decision of the United States Trustee for
Region [ ] Regarding Chapter 7 Trustee [ ], Clifford J. White III, Acting Director, Exec. Office for
the U.S. Trustees, Case No. 05-0004, at 6 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice Nov. 1, 2005) (final agency action),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ust/legacy/2015/01/25/case05-0004.pdf
(suspending
trustee from panel for four months in part for conducting inadequate investigations at meeting of
creditors).
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2. Duty of Loyalty
As previously flagged, the real challenge trustees face is divergent
interests, and this implicates the fiduciary duty of loyalty. I use a taxonomy
dividing “external” from “internal” loyalty issues involving the trustee. 22
External loyalty refers to potential conflicts between the trustee himself and
all the bankruptcy estate stakeholders. Self-dealing would be the classic
example of such an external conflict of loyalty. 23 The Code addresses this,
among other ways, by the ex ante requirement of trustee disinterestedness,24
which is necessarily inapposite in the DIP context of chapter 11. 25
“Internal” conflicts are more difficult. They pertain to the trustee’s
obligations to a menagerie of heterogeneous creditors. Without anesthetizing
the reader here, I will simply summarize that there are numerous situations
in which beneficiaries of the trustee’s loyalty will be opposed to one another
and the trustee will have to pick which to favor. For example, a secured
creditor likely begrudges the examination of perfection status as an
imprudent expenditure of estate resources, whereas an unsecured creditor
hungers for the potential to drag the exalted down to the trenches of the
unwashed. 26 Does the trustee then have an obligation to pursue avoidance of
any/all potentially unperfected liens? How does characterization of the
trustee as a fiduciary shed any light? The Code and rules settle on a prima
facie trigger, 27 but this gives you a flavor for the embedded competing claims
on the trustee’s affection. Courts are hardly uniform in their treatment of
these matters. For example, they divide on whether a trustee has an obligation
to pay expenses to preserve a secured creditor’s collateral, 28 or whether the
secured creditor should be expected to look out for itself. 29 Ultimately, the
comfort of broad platitudes proves irresistible, with courts eschewing

22. Pottow, supra note 1, at 12–15.
23. See, e.g., In re San Juan Hotel Corp., 71 B.R. 413, 423 (D.P.R. 1987), aff’d in part and rev’d

in part on other grounds, 847 F.2d 931, 950 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that trustee’s relative’s freebie
marriage reception on estate property was “self-dealing” and “conflict of interest”).
24. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14), 701(a)(1) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 154 (2012).
25. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1107(b)(1) (excusing DIP’s professionals from disinterestedness bar
that might be triggered by prior representation of the debtor).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (allowing trustee to void unperfected security interests); see generally In
re J.F.D. Enterprises, 223 B.R. 610, 628 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998) (“[U]nsecured creditors demand
of the trustee the due performance of the trustee’s duties, amid their underlying concern that the
trustee may object to their claims, demand recovery of their prepetition gains as preferences or
fraudulent transfers, and/or question their prepetition business activities with the debtor.”).
27. See, e.g., Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f); In re Atcall, 284 B.R. 791, 799 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2002).
28. See, e.g., In re Kinross Mfg. Corp., 174 B.R. 702, 706 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1994)
(“Procuring insurance would ordinarily be an integral part of the trustee’s duty [to secured
creditor].”).
29. See, e.g., In re Peckinpaugh, 50 B.R. 865, 869 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (finding trustee has
no duty to manage assets, just preserve them until sale, otherwise “it would shift the Trustee’s role
from custodian to investment manager thereby encouraging secured creditors to avoid the
responsibility for their investments”).
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difficult analysis in favor of such old saws as the trustee diffusely owing a
primary obligation to “the corporation” as a whole. 30
Trust law has confronted the issue of competing beneficiaries before
(classically, the income vs. remainder beneficiary), and has developed a duty
of impartiality. 31 Bankruptcy cases have picked up this language, 32 but it is
unclear how much guidance this actually provides. In the trust law realm, the
duty of impartiality manifests in a requirement of according “due regard” to
the interests of all beneficiaries, 33 but even that is in an easier context than
bankruptcy, where portfolio theory can step in to counsel the benefits of
wealth maximization (and trust instruments can pre-specify trustee
exculpation). 34 Thus, the bankruptcy trustee is faced with a seething bed of
angry constituents who are not getting paid, many of whose interests diverge,
all with little helpful guidance from the Code on what her fiduciary duty of
“loyalty” to these charges might require.
C. Immunities & Safeguards
Finally, prior examination of fiduciary obligations of bankruptcy trustees
unearthed a convoluted web of immunities and privileges that protect
bankruptcy trustees from breach of fiduciary duty lawsuits. This, in my view,
is an implicit recognition that the conflicting demands on a trustee’s loyalty
make it near-guaranteed that litigation from disgruntled creditors will arise.
But doctrines with such exotic labels as Barton and McNulta all serve to
protect the trustee from all but the most egregious violations. 35 These
immunity doctrines reflect a concession that (internal) conflict is just “in the
air” in bankruptcy.
30. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 344, 353 (1985)
(opining that the “trustee plays the role most closely analogous to that of a solvent corporation’s
management,” which broadly owes its “fiduciary duty to . . . the corporation”); see also In re Troy
Dodson Constr. Co., 993 F.2d 1211, 1216 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[F]iduciary duty [flows] to all creditors,
not just the unsecured creditors.”) (emphasis omitted); In re JMW Auto Sales, 494 B.R. 877, 893
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013) (noting trustee owes duty to “the [e]state”).
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 232 (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (“Impartiality
Between Successive Beneficiaries”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 (AM. LAW INST.
2003) (“A trustee has a duty to administer the trust in a manner that is impartial with respect to the
various beneficiaries of the trust . . . .”); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 803 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010)
(“Impartiality”); 3 JUSTIN W. SCOTT, WILLIAM F. FRATCHER & MARK L. ASCHER, SCOTT AND
ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 17.15 (5th ed. 1995) (“Duty of Impartiality”).
32. See, e.g., In re Comput. Learning Ctrs., Inc., 268 B.R. 468, 473 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2001)
(“[the chapter 7 trustee is] charged with impartially administering the estate entrusted to him.”)
(emphasis added).
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
34. See Pottow, supra note 1, at 14–15, n.60; see also UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § CMT.
AT 10–12 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994) (prescribing trustee duty to diversify invested assets in name
of prudent wealth maximization).
35. See McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 332 (1891) (holding that when trustee is sued in
personal capacity, the trustee is immune for actions performed within the scope of his duties);
Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 136–37 (1881) (establishing that suits against trustees in
connection with estate administration require appointing court’s leave).
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Fiduciary duty law’s limited helpfulness is even more pronounced in the
chapter 11 context where the DIP is thrust into a fiduciary fox role and
entrusted to guard the estate henhouse. 36 This may be why the Code builds in
a number of structural procedural safeguards to check these concerns.37 For
example, the Creditors Committee, funded by the estate, can serve as a check
on the DIP. 38 Similarly, the bankruptcy court’s oversight of debtor conduct
means not only that the DIP is being watched, but also that creditors who
have conflicting interests can ventilate their disputes in an open forum, rather
than just pestering the trustee/DIP to favor them in the discharge of fiduciary
duty. 39 Moreover, the beleaguered fiduciary can always seek direction from
the court for cover. 40 Thus, the public resolution of a bankruptcy case, in a
sense, can fill some of the gaps that fiduciary duty law leaves when applied
to DIPs (and even trustees). In this regard, I confess to a somewhat
consequentialist view of fiduciary duty law in this context: as a means to
police and resolve conflicting stakeholder interests, especially regarding
internal conflicts of interest. In the bankruptcy courtroom, those conflicts can
come out openly in motion practice; not every creditor dispute needs to be
shoehorned into a claim of breach of fiduciary duty. Differences of opinion
by adversaries are simply litigated as fights over whether, for example, the
court should approve or deny a motion to sell estate property.
II. LESSONS FROM FIDUCIARY DUTIES FOR BANKRUPTCY
M&A
What can we learn from thinking seriously about the trustee’s fiduciary
duties in bankruptcy in considering the challenges faced by claims trading
and related issues of bankruptcy M&A? 41 At root, the problem seems to be
one of “Creditors Behaving Badly.” Thus, at first blush, it may seem that the
fiduciary obligations of the trustee (or DIP) have nothing to say about the
behavior of creditors. And as a first principles matter, that is of course
correct, although bankruptcy courts are creative in stretching obligations to
effect workarounds on formal limitations. Consider, for example, In re Food
Management, in which the debtor’s counsel (following a majority approach)
was found to owe fiduciary obligations not just to its client (the DIP), but
36. Cf. Thomas G. Kelch, The Phantom Fiduciary: The Debtor in Possession in Chapter 11, 38
WAYNE L. REV. 1323, 1352 (1992) (“It is said that one cannot serve two masters; in Chapter 11 the
masters are not only two, but profuse—the various groups of creditors and equity interest holders.”).
37. See generally Martin J. Bienenstock, Conflicts Between Management and the Debtor in
Possession’s Fiduciary Duties, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 543, 551 (1992) (cataloging other DIP loyalty
checks).
38. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 330, 1103 (2012).
39. See id. §§ 363(b)(1), (c)(2).
40. See, e.g., Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 274 (1951) (noting that trustee may “seek
instructions from the court” to “effectively protect . . . against personal liability”).
41. This brief article assumes reader familiarity with the creditor exploits chronicled in Janger
& Levitin, supra note 2.
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more broadly to the estate, such that the chapter 11 trustee could pursue
actions for breach. 42 So it is not impossible to envision a “one-step removed”
imposition of a fiduciary duty on the DIP to ride herd over miscreant
creditors, although it would certainly require a stretch.
Still, the analysis of the trustee fiduciary duty issues in chapter 7 does
have some bearing on the bankruptcy M&A world of chapter 11.
Specifically, recall that in the chapter 7 trustee’s world, the greatest problem
fiduciary duty law faces is the internal loyalty conflict of creditor vs.
creditor. 43 Similarly in chapter 11, it seems that the real source of creditor
misbehavior is more one of inter-creditor conflict rather than, say, a creditor
trying to steal property of the estate who needs to be smacked down by a
strict fiduciary obligation. So, can fiduciary duties incumbent on the chapter
7 trustee shed any light on how to deal with Creditors Behaving Badly in the
chapter 11 context?
A. SHORTCOMINGS OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO POLICE
BANKRUPTCY M&A
Consider some of the higher-profile cases, such as In re Lyondell
Chemical Company, where some creditors had credit default swaps and, more
importantly, some had guarantees that ostensibly made them differently
situated from other creditors. 44 These splinter creditors wanted to initiate
involuntary European bankruptcy proceedings, which the domestic court
enjoined to protect the reorganization. 45 Ironically, those foreign proceedings
might have triggered debtor and managerial fiduciary duties to liquidate,46
which presumably the guaranty-holding creditors were much more sanguine
about than the rank-and-file. From the chapter 7 context, we see that the
fiduciary duty of the trustee would have provided no guidance; the trustee
would simply have to favor the preferences of one creditor constituency over
another. And the immunity doctrines would protect the trustee from suit by
42. In re Food Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 380 B.R. 677, 707 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“The majority
rule is that the attorney for a debtor in possession is a fiduciary of the estate.”).
43. See discussion supra Section I.B.2.
44. See In re Lyondell Chem. Co., 402 B.R. 571, 576–78 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). Credit default
swaps obviously made some creditors impervious, even gleeful, regarding the prospect of
nonpayment.
45. Id. at 582–83, 595.
46. Id. at 581–82; see, e.g., Insolvency Act 1986, c. 45, § 214 (UK) (imposing de facto duty to
file by subjecting directors to personal liability if they knew or should have known there was no
“reasonable prospect” the company would avoid insolvent liquidation and failed to minimize
potential losses to the company’s creditors); Burnden Holdings (UK) Ltd. v. Fielding and Another
[2018] UKSC 14 [11] (appeal taken from Eng.) (finding directors “are entrusted with the
stewardship of the company’s property and owe fiduciary duties to the company in respect of that
stewardship” when interpreting the Limitations Act 1980, c. 58, § 21 (UK)); see also, e.g., CARSTEN
GERNER-BEUERLE ET AL., LONDON SCH. OF ECON., DEP’T OF LAW, prepared for the EUROPEAN
COMM’N DG MARKT, STUDY ON DIRECTORS’ DUTIES AND LIABILITY 209 (2013) (noting in Table
4.1.a that twenty-three out of twenty-eight EU countries impose a duty to file for insolvency).
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the losing side. 47 This augurs poorly for fiduciary duties riding to the
conceptual rescue. Now, in fairness, Lyondell may be hard to generalize from
because it had a ready tiebreaker: initiation of the European involuntary
proceedings would jeopardize the reorganization, and so it was easy to point
to the “favor reorganization” maxim in chapter 11 as a thumb on the scale for
the victorious creditor constituency. 48
A perhaps better case to consider the role of fiduciary duties in creditorvs.-creditor conflicts is Dish Network. 49 There, a Schadenfreude creditor, to
use Janger and Levitin’s evocative language, 50 wanted to see the plan fail and
thus scooped up claims in an unregulated marketplace for purposes of
defeating the plan. 51 The court, in designating the claims under § 1126(e) of
the Code was refreshingly candid in the absence of any meaningful guidance
offered by case law for when tolerable “selfishness” crosses the line into
seeking a “benefit” to which the creditor is “not entitled.” 52 True, the court
eschewed the imposition of a fiduciary duty on the creditor, Dish Network,
toward its co-creditors. But note that the institutional safeguards on creditor
conflicts—the Creditors Committee—weighed in to oppose Dish Network, 53
suggesting some of the substantive slack was picked up by procedural checks,
namely, having a designated watchdog in the form of the Committee. And
the court, exercising its own power to oversee an open vote, 54 crushed the
scheming creditor. Thus, we see another instance in which fiduciary duty is
not doing explicit work, but perhaps at most indirectly influencing other
procedural structures within the Code that work to achieve the same
divergent-interest-checking goal.
Indeed, fiduciary duty law seems especially toothless for bankruptcy
when the harms are diffusely scattered to “the market” writ large. In the
remarkable case of Hovnanian, the debtor manufactured a default event at
the instigation of one of its creditors, whose seduction was to offer a
sweetheart DIP loan in exchange. 55 The swap counterparty cried foul,
drawing attention to the systemic effects the scheme would have on the

47. See supra text accompanying notes 35–37.
48. In re Lyondell, 402 B.R. at 581–82.
49. Dish Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD N. Am., Inc.), 634 F.3d 79 (2d Cir.

2010).
50. Janger & Levitin, supra note 2, at 11.
51. Dish Network, 634 F.3d at 104.
52. Id. at 101–02 (citation omitted).
53. See Final Brief of Appellee Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors at 5, 634 F.3d 79
(2d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 10-1175(L), 10-1201(con)), 2010 WL 2831618, at *5 (arguing for affirmance
of decision to designate Dish Network’s votes as being cast in bad faith).
54. Dish Network, 634 F.3d at 105–06.
55. See Solus Alt. Asset Mgmt. LP v. GSO Capital Partners L.P., No. 18 CV 232-LTS-BCM,
2018 WL 620490, at *1, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2018).
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certainty of the derivatives market broadly, 56 but the bankruptcy court saw
no problems. 57 On the contrary, the court commended the debtor in the
discharge of its fiduciary duty to get a good deal on the DIP loan, and noted
that the sophisticated protection seller could look out for itself, and the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) could amend its
contracts to combat prospectively the perceived market evils of engineered
defaults. 58 Fiduciary duty once again offered no check on the creditors.
(Parenthetically, it might be noted that the Hovnanian court’s faith in contract
mechanisms to remedy the problem may be over-optimistic in light of Ion
Media, 59 where a creditor with a clear subordination agreement waiving
confirmation challenges to the reorganization plan nonetheless brazenly
objected to confirmation. 60 So much for contract! Indeed, nothing short of
imposing upon the vulture fund creditor a fiduciary obligation on its cocreditors could have helped police that chutzpah, and notably the ostensible
fiduciary of the creditors, the Creditors Committee, did in fact oppose the
objection.). 61
B. A BETTER ALTERNATIVE? USING COMMODORE STANDING IN
BANKRUPTCY M&A
The most striking example of creditor-versus-creditor infighting laying
bare the trustee’s loyalty problems is Adelphia, 62 where explicit creditor
bickering threatened to sink the entire reorganization. This case vividly
demonstrates the value of process and institutional safeguards over
substantive doctrines of fiduciary duty in addressing this conflict. The court
in Adelphia went a step beyond. Rather than fall back on broad
pronouncements that the DIP should discharge a duty to the “corporation as
a whole,” or invoke trust law’s discharge of the duty of impartiality by having
“due regard” for all beneficiaries and their potential conflicts, the court just
drew the conflict out into the open. In the creditor-versus-creditor fight, the
court ordered the DIP to stay neutral and, accepting the impossible demands
of the internal loyalty conflict, ordered the Creditors Committee to stay
neutral, too. 63 Invoking the doctrine of Commodore standing, 64 the court
56. Id. at *4, *6 (characterizing, with perhaps some melodrama, the issue as “whether market
participants will be unable to accurately assess risks and leave the CDS market, thereby depriving
lenders of a source of insurance and causing reverberating effects in the sector”).
57. Id. at *7.
58. Id. at *4.
59. In re Ion Media Networks, Inc., 419 B.R. 585 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
60. Id. at 598.
61. See infra note 67.
62. In re Adelphia Commc’ns. Corp., 361 B.R. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
63. Id. at 343 (“[T]he Bankruptcy Court established a process to resolve the Inter–Creditor
Dispute by which the Debtors and the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the ‘Creditors
Committee’) were ordered to remain neutral . . . .”).
64. In re Commodore Intern. Ltd., 262 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2001) (deputizing non-DIP to
pursue specific cause of action). Adelphia actually used what might be thought of as “Double
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deputized an ad hoc committee to serve as a special prosecutor of sorts to
bring the action against the renegades and negotiate any settlement.65 The
results were not perfect—the plan was eventually confirmed over this
“prosecutor’s” objections, which were meritorious enough to garner a stay
pending a (later-dropped) appeal 66—but this application unquestionably
drew the disputed issues out into the open through adversarial litigation with
full ventilation and judicial resolution. In a sense, this approach accepted that
picking beneficiaries to favor in a fight like this would be functionally
impossible for any fiduciary. So, instead, we should just let the fiduciaries
off the hook and have the “beneficiaries” duke it out in the open venue of
bankruptcy court while the fiduciaries sit back as neutrals.67
The use of Commodore standing to empower a deputized prosecutorial
subcommittee in Adelphia highlights a procedural apparatus through which
bankruptcy law can achieve the same results as the imposition of a fiduciary
duty of loyalty: the resolution of conflicted interests in distributional fights
over a bankruptcy estate. And it also underscores that the imposition of a
fiduciary duty on the Creditors Committee (which many courts have found)
would do little to resolve the dispute. 68 The litigation of the dispute
necessarily engendered judicial oversight. But there is a corollary for this
model of “procedural bypass” to fiduciary duties to resolve internal loyalty
matters: the judicial institutions (committees, judge, U.S. Trustee, etc.) must
have fulsome information upon which to pursue this public-forum exercise.
To this end, the disclosure spirit of Rule 2019 (as perhaps insufficiently
amended) arguably needs to be augmented. 69 Only with full disclosure can
an open, litigation-driven system of policing conflicts properly function.
Commodore standing,” because the deputized “special prosecutor” was not the Creditors
Committee, but an ad hoc subset. In re Adelphia Commc’ns., 361 B.R. at 343.
65. Id. at 354.
66. Id. at 356 (“While it is true that the Committee could and did object to confirmation of the
Plan (as opposed to the Settlement) at a later date, it then faced an uphill battle based on the fact
that the majority of creditors had accepted the Plan (which included the purported Settlement).”).
67. One might have baseline skepticism whether the judiciary has adequate institutional
competence to get right what might at core be an economic or business question about a failing
business (couched in equitable garb of fiduciary obligation), but that is a discussion—a long, painful
one—for another day.
68. See 11 U.S.C. § 1103 (2012). Indeed, although captioned “Powers and Duties,” § 1103 only
confers discretionary power, not any explicit obligations beyond the caption. Martin Bienenstock
thus says Creditors Committees have only “statutory” duties. Email from Martin J. Bienenstock,
Esq., Partner, Proskauer, to author (Mar. 21, 2018, 12:26 PM EST) (on file with author) (“The safest
interpretation of the statute is the members owe statutory duties to their constituency.”). Although
courts aplenty have found fiduciary duties for the Creditors Committee. See, e.g., In re PWS
Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 246 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Section 1103(c) of the Bankruptcy Code . . . has
been interpreted to imply both a fiduciary duty to committee constituents and a limited grant of
immunity to committee members.”) (citations omitted); In re Tucker Freight Lines, Inc., 62 B.R.
213, 216 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1986) (“[I]mplied in this grant of authority [under § 1103(c)] must
also be a concurrent fiduciary duty to all the unsecured creditors.”).
69. See Fed R. Bankr. P. 2019; 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 2019.01, 2019.02 (Richard
Levin and Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2018); see also, e.g., Janger & Levitin, supra note 2, at
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CONCLUSION
The bankruptcy system is rife with fiduciary obligations, although none
is specified in the Code. The chapter 7 trustee’s most difficult task is
wrestling with “internal” duties of loyalty, namely, how to police the
competing clamoring for her attention from beneficiaries whose interests
often conflict. The short answer is there is not much the trustee can do, even
though trust law nominally offers a “duty of impartiality” to provide (deeply
laissez-faire) guidance. The longer answer is that there are procedural and
institutional structures within the bankruptcy system that compensate for this
substantive legal vacuum. For example, the Creditors Committee serves as a
check on the DIP, and the bankruptcy court itself serves as a check on the
Committee. Thus, when considering the bankruptcy M&A problem that
arises when Creditors Behave Badly, we see that we may not need
substantive trust law to impose fiduciary duties upon those creditors to curb
their behavior (or upon DIPs a derivative obligation to do so). Rather, we can
turn to procedural mechanisms such as Commodore standing to drag those
conflicts out into the light, have a fight about them in open court by two
openly antagonistic adversaries, and judicially resolve them through a
disinterested arbiter. The caveat, however, to such an approach, is the full
flow of information so the conflicts can indeed come into the open. Ensuring
that transparency is probably, in reality, the greatest challenge the bankruptcy
system faces with bankruptcy M&A.

71–72 (discussing In re Northwest Airlines, 363 B.R. 701 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), in which an ad
hoc group of creditors were required to make various disclosures, including the amount paid for any
“claims or interests” in the debtor). Critique of Rule 2019 is best left for another day.

